Mr. President, before initiating my remarks, let me

express the admiration and respect I have for the chairman of this

committee, Senator Collins of Maine, as well as the ranking Democrat,

Senator Lieberman of Connecticut. What they have presented to the

Senate is an extraordinary work product, if one considers the fact that

we first received the 9/11 Commission report on July 22, and a mere 8

or 9 weeks later we are on the floor of the Senate considering landmark

legislation. The first reaction of anyone who listens to those dates

would be that they must be acting in haste.

The fact is that no sooner did Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman

receive this report than they announced they would take it extremely

seriously and they would do some things unprecedented around this

institution to try to move the legislation on a timely basis. It meant

asking Senators to return in the month of August, a month when we are

usually either back in our States or vacationing with our families, to

come back and to have a series of hearings, starting with Governor Kean

and Congressman Hamilton, Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, and

then a long series of many scores of witnesses who came and talked to

us about aspects of this report.

They followed those hearings in August and early September with a

markup last week which I attended as a member of the committee, a

markup which considered 33 different amendments. Those were serious

amendments, complicated amendments. Each one of them tested us to think

long and hard about the 9/11 Commission report as well as the bill that

is before us.

The interesting thing about the amendments that were considered is

that when all was said and done--some had been adopted, some had been

defeated--not a single amendment passed or was defeated on a partisan

roll call.

It wasn't Republicans versus Democrats. That is a good sign. It shows

we took to this task in a bipartisan fashion and made concessions to

try to find solutions.

I, frankly, do not disparage debate on the Senate floor. It is an

important part of what we do. Even heated debate I find informative and

sometimes entertaining. But this morning at the town meeting which I

had with Senator Fitzgerald, a constituent from Illinois came up and

said: Why do you argue so much? Why don't you just get together, the

two political parties, and solve the problems?

I understand that sentiment. And though our arguments and debate may

sound adolescent or a waste of time, they are, in fact, the noise of

democracy. The debate in our committee, the Governmental Affairs

Committee, which led to the adoption of some amendments and rejection

of some amendments, led to a good bipartisan work product which we

bring to the Senate floor today. I am proud to support it and proud to

be a cosponsor.

There are two parts of it in which I take particular pride. One

relates to the civil liberties board. The civil liberties board was an

idea of the 9/11 Commission. They understood, as I think all of us do,

that historically when the United States was concerned about security

issues and safety issues, those were the moments when our Government

asked for more power to protect America, usually at the expense of

individual rights and liberties. It is a delicate balance and delicate

negotiation between security and liberty.

Again, after 9/11, the first invasion in the continental United

States since the British stormed this building in the War of 1812,

after that our Government came and asked for more authority to go after

the terrorists and to protect our Nation. On a bipartisan basis we gave

that authority to the Government.

We understood that it was a risky decision. We were enacting the

PATRIOT Act at a time of high emotion, when we were still very mindful

of the tragedy of 9/11 and the thousands of innocent Americans killed,

as well as their families who were grieving. We gave that authority to

our Government and said we will put a time limit on some of these new

powers and we will revisit them in the future to see if we have gone

too far.

At every step of the way, we want to balance the security of this

country and the liberty of Americans, and not to go too far in giving

powers to Government at the expense of the rights and freedoms that we

enjoy and which make us America. This civil liberties board, proposed

by the 9/11 Commission, was consistent with that value. On a bipartisan

basis, the Commission came and said, create within the executive branch

a civil liberties board; this civil liberties board will be a guardian,

if you will, of the basic rights of Americans. It will measure the

policies and activities of our intelligence community and report

regularly, on a public basis, as to whether there has been a Government

effort that has gone too far.

I am not sure there is another board like this in any other part of

our Government, but I applaud the 9/11 Commission for suggesting it. I

certainly applaud Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman for

incorporating the original civil liberties board in this legislation

and accepting several amendments that I offered, which I think make the

board even more independent and worthy of the duties that are entrusted

to it.

Senator Kyl of Arizona came to the floor this morning and suggested

amendment No. 3801. It is an amendment to the civil liberties board

section. In my estimation, it would really undermine the effectiveness

of this civil liberties board.

The Senator from Arizona said Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman

failed to make tough choices, in his words, because they were trying to

win unanimous approval of the bill. It is true the bill was reported

unanimously from the committee; despite reservations of some members,

we all came together to report it out. I disagree with the Senator's

premise that this unanimous vote was at the expense of making hard

choices. Trust me, hard choices were made on almost every page of this

lengthy legislation. There is nothing wrong with trying to work

together in a bipartisan fashion. I think Senator Collins and Senator

Lieberman did just that. They made some of the toughest choices.

This legislation would authorize the most significant reorganization

of our intelligence community in 50 years. I believe this legislation

will save lives.

In his remarks on the amendment, Senator Kyl of Arizona suggested

those who were concerned about our fundamental constitutional rights

need to balance our concerns with concerns about the lives of American

citizens. If that is the premise of his position, I don't quarrel with

it. It is always a balance. If you give the Government too much

authority to make us safe and take away from individuals the basic

rights of our country, then what do we have left? When it is all over,

those unique American values have not been protected. Rather, they have

been taken by the Government. So we always want to make sure we have

enough authority in the Government to protect us, but not too much.

That is what this legislation does.

One of the issues we weighed heavily was how to fight the war on

terrorism, while protecting basic liberties. The American people expect

no less.

Let me quote from the 9/11 Commission when they addressed this issue:

The 9/11 Commission recommended this board and, following their

recommendation, the legislation included it.

In fact, the Commission has already endorsed the board created by

this bill. Commissioner Slade Gorton, a former Republican Senator from

the State of Washington, and a member of the 9/11 Commission, and

Richard Ben-Veniste, a Democratic appointee to the Commission, told the

House Government Reform Committee:

Those were the words of two commissioners. If nothing else, it is a

seal of approval of what we offer on the floor today.

I am not surprised that there is some opposition to the board, as

there is some opposition to other provisions in the bill. The board is

a new entity, and many of us are trying to understand exactly what it

would do. But I urge my colleagues to read carefully what we have

achieved with this board. It is an integral part of intelligence

reform. It is independent. Those who serve on the board will be

nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and have fixed

terms.

In addition, there is a requirement for public reporting. So what the

board discovers will not be kept deep in some file or on some computer

in an intelligence agency, but will be reported to the public through

Members of Congress and their committees.

The board will help to ensure that a powerful consolidated

intelligence community does not violate privacy and civil liberties. I

am afraid the Kyl amendment will upset this delicate balance. I want to

speak about three problems associated with that amendment.

Number one, very wisely, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman

included in their bill a standard of review for the civil liberties

board. I think you need to give the board guidelines as they review

government actions. The board is to determine, under current language,

whether Government power actually materially enhances security, whether

there is adequate supervision of the use of the power to ensure

protection of civil liberties, and whether there are adequate

guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.

Where did we find this particular approach? We found it in the 9/11

Commission report.

Frankly, I cannot understand Senator Kyl's amendment on this issue.

He wants to take out the 9/11 Commission's standard of review. Should

Congress not give this guidance to the board? Shouldn't the members of

the civil liberties board understand their charge and responsibility?

Can it be stated more simply and clearly than in the language I just

read from the 9/11 Commission report? Taking away the standard of

review is to leave the board with no guidance from Congress. That is an

abdication of responsibility.

Secondly, the bill gives the board the authority to obtain the

information they need to determine whether the Government is violating

civil liberties. If somebody outside the Government refuses to provide

information, the board would have the power to issue a subpoena to

obtain it.

That is common sense. An investigative body doesn't have much

authority in this society if it cannot, in compelling circumstances,

subpoena materials it needs.

It is not unusual to give this subpoena authority to a federal

commission or board. Let me name a few of the Federal agencies with

similar authority: National Labor Relations Board, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission.

The Senator from Arizona, in speaking to his amendment this morning,

suggested this subpoena authority would give the power to the board to

``haul in any agent anywhere in the world and drill him.'' I am afraid

that statement is not accurate. The subpoena authority in this bill is

a narrow one. It only applies to people outside the Government. So for

the Senator from Arizona to argue that we are going to call in an

intelligence agent before the board and drill him is to overlook the

obvious: The subpoena authority in the bill only applies outside of the

Government.

The obvious question is, why do you need subpoena authority outside

of the Government? Here are two specific examples: First, the Abu

Ghraib prison scandal. Implicated in that scandal were private

contractors hired by our Government to interrogate prisoners.

Information they generated might be the domain and property of these

private companies. If the civil liberties board wanted to look into

prisoner abuse and the companies refused to provide that information

voluntarily, they would need a subpoena. That is why this subpoena

power is in the bill.

In addition, if our Government engages in a cooperative agreement to

obtain data from a private company to protect America from a terrorist

attack, materials possessed by that private company would not be

reviewable, except on a voluntary basis, by the civil liberties board,

unless they had subpoena power. Senator Kyl wants to take away that

subpoena power. In doing that, he will tie the hands of this board when

it comes to gathering the necessary information to meet its

responsibility.

The other thing the Kyl amendment addresses is the section of the

bill entitled ``Informing the Public,'' which requires this civil

liberties board to share information about its work with the public.

This is a good thing, from my point of view. It is a healthy aspect of

the bill. We make provisions so that if the Board is dealing with

classified information, there is no requirement to disclose it.

Otherwise, we say the civil liberties board should inform the public

about their work.

So if the Government has gone too far, there is a public report that

could be reviewed to understand how the civil liberties board reached

its conclusion.

The Kyl amendment would delete this section from the bill so that the

board would not be required to inform the public about its activities.

This directly contradicts the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

As Commissioners Gordon and Ben-Veniste told the House Government

Reform Committee:

I think sunshine is a great disinfectant, and I think the fact that

this information will be made public is a further incentive for those

in our Government not to abuse their power. In the name of protecting

America, they should not destroy America's values and America's

freedoms in a way that jeopardizes what is truly the character of this

Nation.

I think the Kyl amendment, in those three instances, not only

violates the spirit of the 9/11 Commission Report but directly violates

language in the 9/11 Commission Report that has guided this committee

in the creation of this bill.

I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment.

In addition, Mr. President, I wish to speak for a moment to another

provision in this bill that is near and dear to

me. As I mentioned earlier, when we went through the lengthy hearings

on this legislation, there were many things that motivated us--this

great Commission report on a bipartisan basis, the need to protect

America as effectively as possible and as quickly as possible--but

there was another factor.

At many of our hearings, in fact, even appearing as witnesses, were

the survivors in the 9/11 families, the men and women who lost a loved

one in the tragedy of 9/11. I want to take a moment and salute them.

They gave of their time and their lives. They made a commitment to make

certain that those they love did not die in vain. They came to this

committee and asked us to do our part, and we did. I think this

committee was faithful to its charge: to follow the 9/11 Commission and

to come up with a reasonable change in reforming our intelligence

community.

Why is reform necessary? It almost goes without saying. We found in

the 9/11 Commission Report ample evidence that our intelligence

community failed us before September 11. In the Senate Intelligence

Committee on which I serve, we took a review of the intelligence

leading up to the invasion of Iraq. As hard as it is to believe, with

the millions of dollars and thousands of conscientious people involved,

the intelligence gathering before the invasion of Iraq was in many

respects just plain wrong.

The American people, and many Members of Congress, were convinced

that we needed to invade Iraq because of charges that there were

weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons programs, linkage with al-

Qaida--things that turned out to be patently wrong. The intelligence

failed us.

In one celebrated book, an author wrote that the head of the Central

Intelligence Agency, in response to the President's question, Are you

sure there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? is reported to have

said: It's a slam dunk. He said with some certainty the weapons of mass

destruction were there. When we arrived, they could not be found.

We understand the gravity of the threat of terrorism. Those of us who

remember 9/11 and understand the seriousness of this threat want to get

it right, and intelligence is truly our first line of defense. But I

have to tell my colleagues that the 9/11 Commission Report kept

returning to one basic and recurring theme when it came to improving

intelligence and making America safe.

Let me show my colleagues what they said because I think it

demonstrates in a few words why this section of the bill is so

important to me and why I am glad it is part of our work effort.

The 9/11 Commission Report said:

And that turned out to be a major obstacle.

We have a weak system for processing and using the information that

we need to make America safe, and the Commission pointed that out. I

have said this before on the Senate floor, and it bears repeating, that

those who think our information technology was adequate to the task on

9/11 should consider the following.

The computer system at the FBI, the premier law enforcement agency in

America on 9/11/2001, did not have e-mail within their system, had no

access to the Internet, was unable to sort and trace by more than a

one-word reference, and when they finally came up with the photographs

of the 19 terrorists on September 11, the computer system of the FBI

was incapable of sending a photograph over its computer system. They

had to overnight the photographs to their regional offices.

That, to me, is as solid a condemnation of the computer system at the

FBI as anything I read. That is a fact. And if you wonder why we failed

to gather information, to process it, analyze it, and use it

effectively, that is what it comes down to.

On July 10, 2001, an FBI agent in the Phoenix field office sent a

memo to FBI headquarters and to two agents on the international

terrorism squads in the New York field office advising of the

``possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden'' to send

students to the United States to attend civil aviation schools. The

date of that memo is July 10, 2001. The agent based his theory on the

``inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest''

attending such schools in Arizona.

The agent made four recommendations to the FBI. The agent recommended

that we compile a list of civil aviation schools, establish a liaison

with those schools, discuss the theories about bin Laden with the

intelligence community, and seek authority to obtain visa information

on persons applying to flight schools. This was July 10, 2001. Those

were the recommendations in the FBI memo.

The flare went off. The notice was there. Something needed to be

done. His memo was forwarded to one field office. Managers of the bin

Laden unit and the radical fundamentalist unit at FBI headquarters were

addressees but did not even see the memo until after September 11. No

managers at headquarters saw the memo before September 11. The New York

field office took no action. It was not shared outside the FBI.

As its author told the 9/11 Commission, the Phoenix memo was not an

alert about suicide pilots. His worry was more about a Pan Am 103

scenario in which explosives were placed on aircraft. Because it was

not shared, because it was not processed, we find ourselves in

situations more vulnerable.

Mr. President, let me give another illustration of why this

information sharing is so important.

The 9/11 Commission Report tells us that on August 15, 2001, the

Minneapolis FBI field office initiated an intelligence investigation of

Zacarias Moussaoui, a name well known to us now. This man entered the

country on February 23, 2001, began flight lessons at a flight school

in Oklahoma City, and began flight training at Pan American flight

training school in Minneapolis on August 13. Mr. Moussaoui had none of

the usual qualifications for flight training on Pan Am's Boeing 747

flight simulators.

Contrary to popular belief, he did not say he was not interested in

learning how to take off or land. Instead, he stood out because, with

little knowledge of flying, he wanted to learn how to take off and land

a Boeing 747. The FBI agent who handled the case in conjunction with

the INS representative on the Minneapolis Joint Terrorism Task Force

suspected Moussaoui of wanting to hijack airplanes. This is August 15,

2001.

If these respective agencies had the benefit of the Phoenix memo,

brought it together with this information about Mr. Moussaoui, wheels

would have started to turn and dots would have been connected. But,

sadly, that information was not shared.

I can go through other illustrations about why we need to share

information when it comes to ships coming into the United States using

the Great Lakes, which are near and dear to me as a Senator

representing the great State of Illinois, and the city of Chicago, and

how we can use existing information technology to link up facts and

draw good conclusions to protect America.

Sadly, what we have found, despite the passage of 3 years since 9/11,

is we still have not figured out how to make critical information in

our Government computers and other systems of records compatible and

combat terrorism with that new information.

In a statement before the House Government Reform Committee last

month, James Dempsey, executive director for the Center for Democracy

and Technology, a nonprofit public interest group, validated my

concern. He wrote:

He goes on with a much longer statement, but to think that 3 years

after 9/11, after the omissions, errors, and shortcomings which I have

pointed out, we still do not have a dynamic decentralized method for

sharing and analyzing information, which is one of the key elements in

the 9/11 Commission Report.

A case in point I frequently cite is the chronic delays in

integrating FBI and Border Patrol fingerprint databases. This problem

goes back at least 6 years, where the agencies have been unable to work

out the transfer of information. In March of this year, the

Justice Department's Inspector General reported it will take at least 4

more years to combine fingerprint systems. In other words, fingerprints

collected at the border cannot be checked against fingerprints at the

FBI in an integrated fashion so that a suspect at the border can be

found to have been someone with a criminal record or a history which

gives us caution and pause. How can we be any safer if that basic

technology cannot be in place? Six years we failed to come up with it.

The estimate is another 4 years is needed before it might happen.

The FBI fingerprint database contains about 43 million ten-finger

sets of known criminals' prints; the Border Patrol's separate

fingerprint system, about 6 million two-finger sets of prints. One has

to ask, at some point in time, did anyone think that both agencies

should collect the same number of fingerprints from each person? Today

it is much different. They did not integrate their effort because they

were not going to integrate their information. Not integrating that

information does not make us any safer.

For well over 2 years I have urged that we do something significant

and historic to address this failure of our information-sharing system.

I refer back to GEN Leslie Groves, who was authorized and empowered by

President Franklin Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor to start what was then

known as the Manhattan Project.

General Groves understood the possibilities of an atom bomb. At that

point, there had been a cursory and casual inquiry into how it might be

weaponized. After Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt said: We need to

get serious. We need to develop these atom bombs. He said to General

Groves: Turn to the private sector, turn to Government, turn to

academia, bring them all together, and do it in a hurry. We may need

this atom bomb to end this war.

That is how the Manhattan Project was born. I have argued for quite

some time now that if General Groves could accomplish that historic

task in 1,000 days, we can in even less time see dramatic progress in

developing the information technology we need as a Nation. I am sad to

remind my colleagues in the Senate, it has been over 1,000 days since

September 11, and reports from agencies across the board tell us we

have not done that.

The Commission offers two key recommendations for achieving this

unity of effort in sharing information. First, information procedures

should provide incentives for sharing to restore a better balance

between security and shared knowledge. Second, the President should

lead the Government-wide effort to bring the major national security

institutions into the information revolution.

This is from the 9/11 Commission Report:

We understand that without this sharing of information we cannot be

safer as a nation. No agency can do this alone. They have to cooperate

with one another. Throughout the eight hearings of the Governmental

Affairs Committee conducted over the past 9 weeks, I have urged that we

make revolutionary change in information sharing an essential element.

I will tell my colleagues what section 206 of this bill, which

comprises a large portion of the bill, does. We set forth precise and

prudent directives for implementing a trusted information-sharing

network. The President is directed to establish this network. The

network is to be an environment consisting of policies and technology

designed to facilitate and promote sharing. It is modeled on the

comprehensive proposal by the Markle Foundation Task Force on National

Security in the Information Age, which I would like to salute as

another major factor in the development of this section of the bill, as

well as the 9/11 Commission Report.

The network must have certain attributes. This network of information

must be a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment;

built upon existing systems' capabilities currently in use across the

Government; utilize the industry's best practices, including minimizing

the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools and

capabilities whenever possible. I want to dwell on this for one moment.

Some of the critics have the wrong notion that we are trying to

create a massive Government database. That is not what this bill sets

out to do. What it sets out to do is to share the information to solve

problems, to alert America to threats to our security. It is not a

massive Government database.

Employ an information access management approach that controls access

to data rather than just networks; facilitate sharing of information;

provide directory services for locating information; and incorporate

protections for privacy and civil liberties. This is another one that

is absolutely essential. We want to have this information collected,

processed, analyzed, and shared every step of the way.

Through the civil liberties board and express language in this

legislation, we are mindful that we do not want to compromise the

liberties and freedoms of Americans unless there is an absolute need to

protect our lives and our security.

Guidelines must be issued. Requirements satisfying governing the

collection, sharing, and use of information have to be made known so

that this will be an item that is followed very closely.

Let me say what the network is not. Describing what the network is is

only half of the issue. First and foremost, the network called for in

this bill is not a centralized, consolidated system or database.

Furthermore, it is not a mere network; it is a capability. It does not

move data from current systems. It does not require all new systems. It

is a means to make information in existing legacy systems sharable to

authorized users. It is not based on any one architecture or platform.

It does not require one encryption standard. It does not contemplate or

require broad distribution of personally identifiable information. It

does not remove authorization and access control from existing

processes. It is not limited to supporting just the IC. It does not

require next-generation technology to implement.

I see other Members have come to the floor of the Senate to address

aspect of this bill, and I have spoken for a little over 30 minutes. I

want to give them a chance to express their feelings. I will return to

this issue next week.

I hope colleagues on both sides of the aisle will understand that

this historic bill includes in it what I consider to be some of the

most important weapons and important tools for protecting America

against another terrorist attack. We have to be creative, which the 9/

11 Commission Report admonishes us to do, but we also have to use

information in sensible, thoughtful ways to make us safer.

A large section of this bill is directed towards that information

sharing. I tried to engage the Senate in this debate when we created

the Department of Homeland Security, but the time was not right.

Everybody nodded in agreement, but I could not get anything done on the

bill. Thank goodness this bill on the future of the intelligence

community is different, and thank goodness on a bipartisan basis we

have come to understand and believe that if we follow the 9/11

Commission Report, with trusted information sharing, America will be

safer.

I thank Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman for providing this

section in the bill. I look forward to working with them on the passage

of this important legislation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record an

additional illustration on information sharing.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in

the Record, as follows:

Mr. President, in 1957, when America was caught off guard

by the Soviet Union's launch of a satellite named Sputnik, Congress

passed a massive education bill, the National Defense Education Act,

which poured federal funds into the study of math, science and

strategic languages like Russian. Thirty-two years later, the Soviet

Union fell. Following the 9/11 attacks and the Commission's report, we

need to rise to the challenge once again. We must intensify the study

of strategic foreign languages, like Arabic, Pashto and Korean.

According to the Department of Education, only 22 of the 1.8 million

American students who graduated from college last year earned degrees

in Arabic. This figure has remained about the same over the last

decade. And as the 9/11 Commission reported, and the Washington Post

and the New York Times reiterated on Tuesday, the lack of qualified

personnel has left hundreds of thousands of pages of intercepted

terrorist communication untranslated.

On page 77 of the Commission's report, the Commission notes the FBI

``lacked sufficient translators proficient in Arabic and other key

languages, resulting in a significant backlog of untranslated

intercepts.'' On page 92, the report adds, ``Very few American colleges

and universities offered programs in Middle Eastern languages or

Islamic studies.'' The 9/11 report also calls for both the CIA and the

FBI to strengthen their language programs and for the FBI to improve

ability to attract candidates with technological skills.

At a hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Oversight of

Government Management Subcommittee on September 14, 9/11 Commissioner

Fred Fielding described the lack of language skills at intelligence

agencies as: ``embarrassing.'' FBI Assistant Director for

Administrative Services Mark Bullock testified that while the agency is

receiving thousands of applicants, the agency has found it ``difficult

hiring agents with language skills, skills in the right languages.''

We can do better.

The bill we are considering today does address education, but not

completely. This bill calls for better coordination of joint training

among the intelligence agencies and authorizes, but does not direct,

the National Intelligence Director to collaborate with the intelligence

agencies to establish a scholarship program, in which students agree to

work for an agency in exchange for financial assistance with their

education. I commend the managers of the bill for including this

innovative education subsidy-for-service approach. This is an important

mechanism to put in place, although we need to do more to expand

instruction in critical foreign language, particularly in the area of

science and technology. If no one is teaching the classes we need, we

can't improve the pool of qualified applicants from which the

intelligence community can recruit.

The amendment my colleagues from Florida and Hawaii and I sponsored

will expand targeted educational opportunities to promote integration

of intelligence collection and analysis and to prepare intelligence

personnel to work with other agencies.

We ask the National Intelligence Director to assess the current needs

of the intelligence community with respect to language skills;

determine whether the community's needs for critical foreign language

skills and understanding science and technology terms in those

languages are being met; and report to Congress recommendations for

programs to help meet those needs.

In developing its report, the NID is directed to take into account

existing education grant programs through the Departments of Education

and Defense. The first report is due to Congress within one year of

enactment, and then again each year after that.

I thank the Senators from Florida and Hawaii for their willingness to

work together in developing language to strengthen the critical

language education component of the reorganized intelligence community.

And I thank my colleagues from Maine and Connecticut for their

leadership in crafting and managing this important piece of

legislation, which now includes this additional focus on strengthening

necessary language skills in this country.